Introduction
By 1950, the Hongkong Bank appeared to have only a very limited life expectancy. The imperial foundations on which its original fortunes had been built were fast disappearing. The British Empire in India had been replaced by four independent countries whose new governments were committed to state direction of their national economies and severe controls on the activities of foreign capitalism. A similar commitment to nationalism and state intervention, though less socialist in orientation, was starting to emerge in Malaya and Singapore which were still under British control. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines were increasing their restrictions on foreign banks. 
The Survival of Laisser Faire
Whatever else accounts for this remarkable triumph over adversity, market competition is not the explanation. Hong Kong has long boasted of its laisser-faire philosophy and its commitment to free markets, no state planning and no controls over investment, minimal economic intervention and no subsidies or tax incentives to promote economic development programmes. But when it came to the financial sector, the colonial administration displayed considerable "ideological" confusion. There was a special case to be made for the supervision of bankers and their behaviour. Paradoxically, this argument was put forward by Sir John Cowperthwaite, a Hong Kong official generally regarded as the ultimate proponent of minimal government. Unlike other companies, he declared, over and above the interests of the shareholders, "there is a second equally, if not more, important, interest requiring protection in the case of banks -that of depositors." 1 This paper will show, nevertheless, that this precept was largely ignored by colonial officials who displayed a deep and abiding reluctance to supervise the banking industry or protect depositors.
Throughout the period under review, there was rarely any doubt as to what the weaknesses of the banking system were and what remedies the colonial administration ought to adopt. In consequence, this paper's main criterion for evaluating the Government's performance is not the merits of a particular regulatory model but the more fundamental question of why officials throughout the period chose policies which were ineffective responses to the industry's chronic instability and were often inconsistent with the advice of leading bankers. But the Government could not totally ignore the political and social costs of banking crises, although officials were less anxious about the economic consequences before World War II. After 1945, the survival of British rule depended increasingly on its "performance legitimacy" and the ability to solve challenges to its economic stability and personal living standards. 2 Thus, it was politically hazardous to expect the community to accept bank runs and financial scandals as the unavoidable consequence of a free market economy.
While most officials were reluctant to regulate, this paper will show how, over a long period, they had serious doubts about the merits of a free financial market. The Government viewed unrestrained competition as a major threat to the stability of individual banks and the financial system as a whole, and official constraints on competition lasted until well after the end of the colonial era. Thus, throughout most of the second half of the twentieth century, Hong Kong's financial services sector was not a free and open market. This paradoxical situation, it will be shown, reflected a general confusion and inconsistency among officials about how to manage economic policy, both before and after World War II, and an inability to understand how financial markets worked.
The Case for Government Intervention
In the early years after World War II, there was a curious ambivalence about laisser faire and whether or not the Hong Kong Government should play a direct role in promoting economic development, particularly of the manufacturing industry. It has become fashionable to present this conflict of opinion as a clash between two sets of vested interests. On one side, it is claimed, were British colonial and commercial interests which had prospered through the China Trade, specialised in financial and commercial services and were thus opposed to any departures from laisser faire which would assist Chinese industrialists.
On the other side, it is said, were their rivals, the Chinese manufacturers who were deliberately held back by laisser-faire policies. These policies served to protect British interests, it is alleged, first by restricting Hong Kong's industrial progress before World War II and then by depriving manufacturers of state incentives and subsidies after the war. The economy became unbalanced, it is argued, overdependent on textiles and denied state support to encourage investment in large-scale projects and advanced technology. 3
A Sino-British Business Consensus
The historical record does not support such a simple classification of attitudes and interests into British and Chinese rivalries. Before World War II, an official Commission of Enquiry dominated by British financial and commercial representatives came out in support of the manufacturing sector, urging more interventionist government policies and a retreat from laisser faire. It recommended that Hong Kong should ignore London's policies that sought to confine industrial development to the United Kingdom, In particular, they campaigned for protection for local industries, government planning to prevent "excessive" competition and access to cheap capital especially for long-term projects and heavy industry. 5 At the same time, there was total support from Chinese and British business for the rapid abolition of the sweeping powers to regulate the economy which the Government had exercised in the emergency conditions after the end of the Japanese Occupation in 1945. The entire business community rejected these controls even though they played an important part in protecting the expansion of the vital textile industry from cut-throat Japanese competition as that country's post-war reconstruction got under way. 6 The sort of government intervention in the economy that business advocated had clear boundaries.
It was not intended to facilitate state interference with business activities of the private sector but to protect its markets and promote its profits.
Pragmatic Colonialism
The colonial administration reacted to changing economic conditions with some sympathy for business views. In 1954, the Governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, accepted an obligation to assist the manufacturing sector which was Hong Kong's only hope during the acute recession that had followed the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the subsequent economic blockade of the People's Republic which ruined the China Trade. He felt compelled to reject "subsidies [and] ...tariffs on imports of competitive foreign products, for in the long run such methods can only lead to inefficiency and cannot help the industry to sell its products overseas, where their main markets lie." But he acknowledged the case for "indirect help" -principally through cheap industrial sites and buildings. 7 The Government's apprehensions then shifted away from the Mainland which was grappling with the economic disasters that followed the collapse of the 1958 "Great Leap Forward." Now it was mounting protectionism in Western markets that was seen as imperilling Hong Kong's export industries, and the Government publicly posed the question in 1960 of whether "to abandon our traditional policy of laissez faire" in order to control total production and regulate export prices. 9 It subsequently expressed its willingness to listen to proposals to aid "infant industries." 10 As late as 1964, another Governor was prepared to contemplate departures from laisser faire on condition that they promised tangible benefits. 11 Thus, until at least the mid-1960s, the consensus within the business community was opposed to the colonial laisser-faire traditions and strongly in favour of policies to protect local producers and to foster investment. The colonial administration, for its part, had no ideological scruples about diluting its laisserfaire practices and was prepared to make decisions about economic policy on pragmatic grounds rather than out of principle.
The Case for Interventionism Crumbles
If the colonial administration had given way to these pressures both from the business world and from within the bureaucracy, the financial sector would have been considerably affected. In particular,
•
Government supervision of new industrial investment to suppress unrestricted competition among manufacturers would have had an immediate impact on the freedom of banks to allocate loan finance and on their management of credit risks.
• The establishment of an industrial development corporation or bank would have created a source of subsidised funding which, by definition, would have undercut the banks and the stock exchange.
In the event, the Government did not abandon laisser faire. This decision had little to do with loyalty to • The older and larger businesses also saw government intervention as the remedy for "anarchic" business conditions in which the smaller and more vulnerable firms were free to spoil the market by undercutting the established exporter even at the risk of their own bankruptcy. In the 1960s, an orderly structure was being forced on Hong Kong's manufacturers and exporters by the allocation system through which the Government administered the textile quotas that Western importing nations had placed on Hong Kong's textiles. 14
Funding the Manufacturers
While the larger debate over laisser faire faded away, the calls for subsidised investment funds continued.
Given the dependence of the colonial administration on the business elite for political endorsement, 15 it was not surprising that industry's demands for low-cost finance had a more lasting impact on officials than the case for better protection of bank depositors.
There was a considerable campaign in the late 1950s to induce the Government to intervene directly to make up for what manufacturers criticised as defective lending policies inappropriate for an industrial economy. They were encouraged by the support which the Governor, Sir Robert Black, gave to the concept of an industrial development corporation or bank, an initiative which he set up a committee to study. 16 This body, which included local Chinese as well as British bankers, rejected the proposal despite intense lobbying from Chinese and British commercial and industrial bodies. The case it made in 1960 against the government provision of industrial finance was simple and persuasive. 17
• Neither the manufacturers nor the officials who supported the industrial lobby were able to produce evidence of any reasonable loan request that, in the past, had failed to obtain bank facilities.
• Development strategies adopted by other Third World economies were inappropriate for Hong on light industries resulted in low capital/output ratios, which promoted full employment, rapid amortisation of investments and a high turnover of capital.
• The argument for an industrial bank in Hong Kong was misconceived. Its supporters were seeking to divert resources away from highly profitable light industrial operations and into longer-term projects. These would not be viable unless they were provided with capital at below market cost (which would come at the expense of booming, export-driven light industry).
Despite the unassailable logic of these findings, the struggle went on, thanks to the tenacity of officials in the Commerce and Industry Department. They returned to the fray in 1969. Although two confidential surveys conducted by the Department failed to produce any evidence that manufacturers were hampered by a lack of finance, its directorate mobilised industrialists to lobby once more for subsidised finance for small and medium enterprises at a time when the colonial administration was unusually vulnerable to political pressure. 18 This ploy provoked significant opposition within the administration, which delayed the introduction of an industrial loan scheme until 1972. 19 Its results were disappointing, and the scheme was wound up in 1976 and was not revived until after the end of British rule. 20
The Case against Laisser Faire
The case for government intervention in the financial services sector was very different from manufacturing and the rest of the economy. There was a pattern of imprudent lending and incompetent management in banking which had made the financial system very vulnerable to downturns in the business cycle . 19 The delay was caused principally by Cowperthwaite, it seems, who had publicly pointed out that the surveys discredited the case for any such scheme. remained largely unutilised. In 1964, the Government acquired new, extensive legal powers which it preferred to exercise as minimally as possible, at considerable cost to the public and the economy as a whole.
Chaos and Crashes
Financial institutions and markets are the one sector of the economy where non-interventionism is not an appropriate policy even for the most laisser-faire regimes. The dangers of fraud, market failure and consequent public panic are particularly acute in this sector. Rumours that a deposit-taking institution was in trouble were enough to trigger bank runs in Hong Kong in every post-war decade up to 1991. 21 The alternative to state intervention is the risk of instability disrupting transactions across the entire economy. In consequence, to a much greater degree than manufacturing or commerce, the financial system needs an effective legal structure. But these were realities which officials tried to ignore throughout most of the colonial era.
Yet, the Government could not escape completely from involvement with the currency and financial institutions. In Hong Kong, as in the rest of the British Empire, such issues as the right to issue currency and what constituted legal tender were defined by law. 22 The fundamental financial "product" was the bill of exchange, whose validity and acceptability in the market place were governed by statute. 23 The right to accept deposits from the public and then lend them out to the bank's customers was regarded as a particular privilege at the beginning of the colonial era, which, at the time, London sought to police quite stringently. 24 Not until 1948, however, was there any Hong Kong legislation for the licensing of local banks.
To aggravate the situation, unlike most modern economies, Hong Kong until 1993 had no central banking institution to oversee financial institutions, monitor financial markets and maintain the stability of the currency. Initially, the Bank of England had mistrusted Hong Kong's capacity to perform these functions.
But even more important was the rejection of such a role by the colonial administration itself. 25 Effective regulatory powers were introduced only in 1964, but their implementation was uninspired and ineffectual for the next two decades, as the following sections will explain.
From very early in colonial history, the colonial administration showed little understanding of the importance of a legal structure to ensure the stability of the financial system. In 1895, for example, the Attorney General had to confess in the legislature that the entire currency in circulation lacked legal 21 The last such incident occurred in July 1991 when "following the sanction, a fact that had been recently reported to the Colonial Office. On London's instructions, legislation was rushed through in one sitting to regularise the situation, though without penalising the banks involved or outlawing the notes already in circulation. 26 Laisser faire otherwise reigned unrestricted. There were no legal restraints on the entry of firms and individuals into the financial services sector (except for the note-issuing banks), and few constraints on their business practices, apart from the normal provisions of company and criminal law. The colonial administration simply did not accept any obligation to exercise supervision over Hong Kong's domestic financial institutions to protect either depositors or investors. Until World War II, the Government chose to ignore the chaotic banking conditions, and there was no statutory or administrative structure through which to supervise local banks. 27 Officials had two excuses for adopting this attitude between the wars.
The first was a preoccupation with the instability of the currency, which, like the Mainland, was on a volatile silver standard. 28 The second was a shortage of the economic expertise needed to understand the way in which the financial system functioned. 29 Nevertheless, there was a growing recognition of the financial system's vulnerability during the 1930s.
Thus, an official committee indicated very plainly in 1930 its awareness of two problems. The first was the drawbacks of a note-issue that was not under government control. The second, and far more serious, was the inadequate system for adjusting the money supply and the lack of a proper monetary policydefects that were to persist until the 1990s, as will be discussed below. But both the committee and the colonial administration preferred not to become involved in these issues. 30 The danger signals grew clearer. The official commission reviewing economic policy warned of the fundamental instability of the local banking system which suffered from inferior management and excessive involvement in property -defects that were to handicap Hong Kong banking until the 1980s.
These made "a financial collapse inevitable when a major depression occurs," but the official report concluded lamely that "it may not be possible to legislate against this danger." The commission took more seriously the fragility of "savings banks" and called for government regulation, but mainly to protect the poor rather than to promote financial stability. 31 A confidential committee dominated by business representatives was established, which in 1936 recommended radical reforms through new legislation. All banks should obtain a licence, which might be withdrawn. Official approval would be required for new branches. Most important, an "examiner of banking" should be appointed to supervise the industry, with powers to investigate and obtain information.
London approved these proposals and gave special support to the creation of a banking examiner. 33 Within the colonial administration, however, these moves towards a larger role for government in banking regulation aroused serious opposition. Hong Kong's senior financial official claimed that a more stable banking system would lead to lower interest rates, which would prove unpopular with the public: "The truth is I think that the Chinese depositor would much rather get a higher rate of interest and lose his entire capital every twenty years or so than get a low rate of interest with security." 34
Officials were particularly alarmed by the prospect of an "examiner of banking" and preferred to bury the proposals. They ignored business lobbying in favour of protecting small savers in particular. They successfully ignored pressures from London to move ahead with legislation until the Japanese invasion in December 1941. 35 Thus, Hong Kong lost the opportunity to put in place a comprehensive system to ensure the integrity of its banks, to monitor their stability and to enforce the standards of banking practice and prudent lending that would protect depositors. It was to be another three decades before the colonial administration implemented the 1936 proposals which had been endorsed both by leaders of the business community and by the United Kingdom authorities. In the meantime, imprudence and malpractice continued to reign virtually unchecked.
Laws with Flaws
In the first post-war years, the Government seemed at last to have grasped the importance of ensuring a sound banking system. For the first time, legislation was introduced to regulate banking activities.
Officials expressed a desire in 1947 to end the situation in which firms were free to set up as banks without adequate resources. The Government also wanted to curtail "organisations doing business of the nature of banking business which is not in fact of value to the Colony since they are engaged in speculation or in the infringement of trade or exchange control regulations of this Colony or of China. 45 There were "three ...strictly unorthodox banking practices to which limits are set by the bill, i.e. unsecured advances to directors, share dealing and property investment, under one overall limit of 55% of capital and reserves (which is the total of the three previously separate limits) and an individual limit for any one of them of 25%; thus limiting total indulgence in these practices while giving some choice as to the extent of indulgence in each one." J. if the laws governing financial transactions were strictly enforced. They colluded to conceal the fact that almost all foreign trade contracts were legally unenforceable from 1949 to 1967 because they did not conform to the requirements of foreign exchange controls (even though it had been to overcome this specific illegality that the first post-war banking legislation had been enacted, as mentioned above). 49 • Officials believed that the real threat to banking stability and financial integrity was excessive competition. Until the mid-1980s, they regarded a restriction on the number of financial institutions, rather than their effective supervision, as the crucial safeguard. 50 Officials even saw the market impact of more efficient banks as increasing the vulnerability of the banking system. 51 Thus, the new supervisory framework that was established in 1964 proved wholly inadequate to prevent chronic weaknesses and recurrent scandals in the banking sector and the financial markets, despite considerable legislative tinkering over the next two decades.
Little Competition
It is possible to distinguish two related but often incompatible considerations in the Government's postwar policies for dealing with the financial services sector. The first was a constant anxiety about the fragility of the financial system rather than concern about the integrity of institutions. The second was an abiding reluctance to become involved in regulation.
The conviction that competition was dangerous was very deep-rooted. Even at the end of the twentieth century when Hong Kong had developed a robust regulatory structure, officials still claimed that competition was "a double-edged weapon... that...can pose a threat to banking stability... [and] threaten the wider performance of the economy." 52 As a result, from the mid-1960s until after the end of British rule, the colonial administration supported direct measures to limit the free operation of financial markets.
• Price fixing: In the early 1960s, the Hongkong Bank successfully organised an industry-wide agreement to set charges, commissions and fees. The Government came to recognise the value of this arrangement in reducing competitive pressures. The cartel became so important to official policy that it was put on a statutory basis in 1981. Its powers were administered through the Hong 57 From the start, the industry itself had reservations about this restriction, 58 and officials eventually came to question its merits. 59 But even after the ban was lifted, foreign banks were still subject to severe restrictions on their branch banking. These were abolished finally in 2001, followed by liberalisation of market entry criteria the following year.
• Informed choice: Customers were deprived of the information to make a fully informed choice of banks because banking legislation did not require complete disclosure of key information in the published accounts of financial institutions. Hong Kong in the 1990s still lagged behind other major financial centres, particularly New York, in this respect. 60 Only after 1994 were the criteria for financial disclosure raised to match international standards. 61
Even Less Regulation
The problem was not that the Government lacked the legal powers to intervene effectively but that it saw no need to adopt coherent and coordinated policies about how they should be employed. Despite all its flaws, the new legislation conferred "draconian powers" on the Banking Commissioner (compared with the United Kingdom which did not enact similar but "much milder supervisory powers" for another fifteen years). 62 Yet, officials were as narrow in their interpretation of its provisions as they had been of 54 Until 1995, it had also set the minimum commissions and charges for such services as foreign exchange and securities.
Stephen for the prudential conduct of business by companies, which it is not intended to accept." 66 The dangers of this policy were highlighted by the DTCs' contribution to an alarming upsurge of property and stock market speculation in 1978, and some supervision was extended belatedly to them. 67 Inevitably, "imprudence, mismanagement, and malpractice" continued to flourish and led to a spate of collapses among DTCs, whose failures helped to bring down seven licensed banks between • The Government failed to understand the extent to which the lack of regulation in other parts of the financial markets contaminated the banking (and DTC) sector. There was a stubborn reluctance to overhaul company law and the regulation of the securities industry until after major crises. The existing legislation became indefensible following the share collapse of 1973 and its inevitable corporate scandals which the Governor blamed on the way "laissez-faire produced excessive risks." 70 But regulation remained ineffective until the 1987 global stock market collapse made it impossible to tolerate any longer the wholly inadequate regulatory arrangements for the securities industry previously defended in the name of laisser faire that had been "ineptly used and grossly abused." 71 • The Government's disregard for its regulatory responsibilities was so great that it consistently failed to provide adequate resources, both in terms of staff for prudential supervision of the banks and funds for the adequate supervision of DTCs. The situation was very similar in the securities industry, where an official inquiry found that the regulator had never been given the resources "to implement and enforce the legislation introduced in the 1970s." 72
From a "Government" to a Global Bank
The Hongkong Bank was a major beneficiary of the Government's inconsistencies in developing a modern regulatory system, as the analysis that follows will show. The market crises and corporate scandals that were a regular feature of Hong Kong until the establishment of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 1993 provoked regular "flights to quality" as nervous depositors fled to the highest-quality bank accessible to them, which was the Hongkong Bank group. As the largest financial institution, the group profited from the Government's protection of existing banks against retail price competition and the entry of new competitors, especially from overseas. The Hongkong Bank also did handsomely over a long period of time out of its privileged position as the colonial administration's principal banker. Nevertheless, its executives were frequently disenchanted with the economic consequences of laisser-faire policies and became outspoken advocates of government intervention.
Regulation under Laisser Faire
In the 1950s, the Hongkong Bank took much the same jaundiced view of non-interventionism in the financial services sector as the leading British commercial firms did of the absence of industrial development programmes and government aid for manufacturers. It joined forces with local Chinese bankers to demand an end to laisser faire and for the introduction of government regulation to stabilise the banking industry. In addition, local bankers wanted the establishment of a central bank, and the Hongkong Bank proposed legislation that would have been a major step in that direction. 73 Initially, the bank also wanted the colonial administration to adopt an active monetary policy. In 1955, the bank took the lead in countering a burst of speculative activities through a credit squeeze, 74 which was reinforced by the Government's transfer of funds out of the local currency and into sterling. However, the bank then changed its mind about the desirability of official leverage on the money supply. It lobbied successfully against further transfers of funds to London, and they ceased between 1959 and 1969. 75 In the 1970s and 1980s, the bank went back to its original stance as it grew alarmed at the absence of an effective monetary policy and the enfeebled regulatory arrangements, both of which increased the vulnerability of financial markets in the opinion of its senior executives.
In part, this change probably reflected a sense of "unfair" competition. The bank pursued conservative lending policies but many of its rivals did not. 76 It campaigned vigorously but in vain for government action to halt the surge in share speculation that led to the stock market collapse in 1973. 77 This bubble was fuelled by the banking system, and a confidential government survey showed that lending against shares rose from 8 per cent of total bank loans and advances at the end of 1970 to 18 per cent at the end of 1972. 78 A similar situation emerged in 1982-85. Once again, the bank's senior executives were very vocal during the run-up to the crisis in warning that the regulatory system was breaking down and the money supply was out of control. Tables 1 and 2 and the accompanying analysis in the Statistical Appendix. 
Benefiting from Official Blunders
Nevertheless, the Hongkong Bank profited directly from the regulatory ineptitude and the Government's fear of competition. The frequent bank runs and corporate scandals were a reminder to the community of the attractions of a large, conservatively-run institution, which helped to reinforce the proportion of total deposits held with the Hongkong Bank group. This "flight to quality" was very marked, for example, during 1965 in response to that year's severe banking crisis, when the group's share of total deposits rose sharply. 80 An even more significant benefit for the Hongkong Bank in 1965 was its chance to acquire the Hang Seng Bank which had suffered a catastrophic run, losing 39 per cent of its deposits in the first four months of the year. 
Non-price Competition
The banking cartel and its restrictions on price competition were the colonial administration's most important anti-competition weapon. In the retail sector, market share depended on non-price competition.
Until 1984, the size of the branch network was crucial. Here foreign banks were restricted and smaller local banks lacked the resources to match the Hongkong Bank's ability to expand. In 1986, it accounted for the largest share -31 per cent -of the total number of bank branches. 88 But in that year, as noted above, its share of total bank deposits was 42 per cent, which indicates that the number of branches was only part of the story in pursuing market dominance. Of growing importance were such factors as technology, new products and services and advertising. 89 In these fields, the scale of the Hongkong Bank group's operations gave it a significant advantage: it could afford to outspend its competitors in the retail sector, if it chose, while holding down unit costs.
A Quasi-central Bank
In the wholesale sector, different conditions prevailed, and here the bank's traditional privileges as premier banker to the Government and manager of the clearing house were key factors in reinforcing its market share. Until the closing years of the colonial era, the Government was forced to rely on the Hongkong Bank both for normal banking business and in order to intervene in the financial markets in the absence of a conventional central bank. The bank's three most significant functions as "government banker" were:
• It assisted in maintaining the official exchange rate and cooperated with the colonial administration in ensuring that exchange control regulations were applied as minimally as possible. 90 • It administered the clearing house for the banks and DTCs.
• It acted as lender of last resort at whatever overnight rates the market would bear and aided banks in distress. (Rescue operations were underwritten by the Government. 91 )
In the closing decades of British rule, the bank was forced to shed these roles, but removal of its privileges proved complex and protracted.
By 1983, the colonial administration could no longer reject responsibility for managing the external value of the currency. After an economic and political crisis had driven the Hong Kong dollar down that year by 28 per cent against its American counterpart, the Government linked the exchange rate to the United States currency. Maintenance of the linked rate became an overriding priority. This development transformed the Government's relationship with the banking industry and made it inevitable that officials would have to take direct responsibility for central bank functions that previously had been carried out by the Hongkong Bank. 92 The next area in which the Hongkong Bank's central banking functions came under challenge was its control of the clearing house. This role allowed the bank to use, free of charge, the surpluses of the banking system. In addition, the bank could lend out these funds at commercial rates to any institution with a negative balance at the end of the business day (making it technically illiquid). Pressure for reforms began in the 1980s with complaints from the banking industry about paying their major competitor for facilities provided elsewhere by central banks. 93 More serious, however, was the growing realisation that the clearing house role could enable the Hongkong Bank to insulate itself from government measures to enforce its monetary objectives. 94 At first, senior officials did not realise the seriousness of this situation. 95 But in 1988 they took steps to ensure that all financial institutions, including the Hongkong Bank as the largest player, could be compelled to cooperate with official monetary policies. 96 In 1992, the bank ceased to be the lender of last resort. Henceforth, the Government would make liquidity available to banks with temporary shortfalls. This role was taken over in the following year by the newly-established Hong Kong Monetary Authority, which was now assuming all the Government's central banking functions previously carried out by the Hongkong Bank. 97
Not a Very British Bank
The retention by the Hongkong Bank of its quasi-central bank role until the final years of the colonial era did not make it a docile agent of the colonial administration or a bastion of British commercial interests. By the 1960s, though not without considerable reluctance, the bank had come to appoint Chinese staff to managerial positions and started to create a branch network to cater to the new manufacturing firms which were rapidly emerging as the backbone of the post-war economy. 99 A major consequence of these internal developments was a drastic shift in the focus of the bank's expatriate executives during the 1970s. Around them, they could observe how the great names of British commercial history in the Far East were almost all fading. 100 The future belonged to Chinese entrepreneurs, and the Hongkong Bank proved very successful in picking winners whom it then backed enthusiastically against their British rivals.
The first important demonstration of this new business model came in 1979. Hutchison Whampoa, controlled by Sir Douglas Clague, a distinguished British public figure, had to be rescued from bankruptcy by the Hongkong Bank in 1975. After the firm had been restored to financial health, the bank had a choice. It could offload the company to a leading British conglomerate. Instead, it was sold to Li Kashing, a manufacturer who had made a fortune from real estate. 101 Far more dramatic was the bank's decision the following year to support a Chinese shipping magnate, Sir Pao Yue-kwong, in a takeover battle against the Jardine group, one of the most famous names in Britain's Asian empire. 102 This renunciation of any obligation on the part of the bank towards its British compatriots was followed by its support for a further foray against Jardine interests led by Li Ka-shing. 103 The lack of patriotic sentiment did not endear the bank to the United Kingdom authorities. In 1982, the Hongkong Bank's attempt to take over the Royal Bank of Scotland was rejected. The Bank of England expressed its doubts as to whether "it could ever be right to allow control [of a United Kingdom clearing bank] to pass into hands not fully committed to the United Kingdom public interest." The British
Monopolies and Mergers Commission accepted the Bank of England's views, observing that although the United Kingdom was the sovereign power in Hong Kong, "the Government there must have primary regard to the welfare of its population and the interests of its territory." 104 The British authorities realised that neither the colonial administration nor the Hongkong Bank were prepared to sacrifice Hong Kong's economic interests at London's behest.
An Overview
This account of the development of banking policies in Hong Kong after World War II and their effect on the Hongkong Bank highlights the peculiar nature of laisser faire in the colonial administration's management of the economy. There is considerable merit in the claim that finance was "the one sector where there seems to have been a true adherence to 'positive non-interventionism'." 105 But another distinguished economic historian has argued that such non-interventionism was inconsistent with a proper interpretation of laisser faire. The colonial administration totally disregarded its responsibility "for maintaining a sound currency and a sound credit structure," he insisted, thus rejecting a duty of the state which had led nineteenth-century Britain to restrict "the powers of bankers and the owners of capital" -in marked contrast to twentieth-century Hong Kong. 106
Unaccountable Government
How was the colonial administration able to survive the frequent crises and scandals that caused serious 
Cultural Adjustments
For its part, the Hongkong Bank was able to survive the social and political uncertainties of Hong Kong during the second half of the last century partly through its own willingness to look beyond the limits of its colonial past. Senior executives showed an unexpected capacity to overcome their lack of familiarity with Asian languages and culture. Despite these handicaps, they found ways to cultivate a new and very different generation of entrepreneurs as Hong Kong switched from its dependence on the China Trade to manufacturing for export in response to the Korean War and the economic blockade of the Mainland.
These executives also had the perspicacity to allow the Hang Seng Bank to retain its separate and totally Chinese identity after its takeover in 1965. In this way, the very colonial Hongkong Bank had a wholly Chinese subsidiary to cater for those segments of the community which felt uncomfortable in a Western business environment.
In all this, the Hongkong Bank was very different to the rest of its British compatriots. None of them was able to retain the superior commercial status with which they had entered the 1970s. Unlike the bank, they had all been overtaken by Chinese rivals. Nor could any Hong Kong firm -Chinese or Britishmatch the bank's success in transforming itself from a predominantly Hong Kong operation into a truly global enterprise.
Political Realities
The Hongkong Bank learnt throughout Asia that the tide of nationalism and anti-colonialism meant that it could not afford to put British interests ahead of the ambitions of the newly-independent nations. 109
Even in colonial Hong Kong, its British identity carried a political risk when radicalism ran rampant on the Mainland. For example, during the worst political violence of the colonial era when the extremism of the Cultural Revolution spilled over into bombs, strikes and rioting in Hong Kong during 1967, the bank lost just over 13 per cent of its total deposits in less than six months. 110 Against this background, the bank had little incentive to display any sentimental attachment to its commercial compatriots when they proved unable to compete with their Chinese rivals in Hong Kong.
It took a similar attitude towards its political relations. As far as possible, commercial considerations were its priority in managing relations with the governments it encountered. Thus, the bank's Chairman made no secret of his opposition to Christopher Patten's political reforms for Hong Kong that were supported by London but opposed by Beijing in the 1990s. 111 But it was not afraid to ignore China's expressed wishes to protect its own interests. For example, in 1984, Deng Xiaoping had asked the British Foreign Secretary to ensure that the colonial administration prevented the bank from moving its headquarters because of the potentially adverse impact of such a relocation on international business confidence. 112 It nevertheless chose to shift its headquarters to London in 1993. Ironically, it did not suffer from the same displays of resentment from Beijing that had followed the Jardine group's decision in the previous decade to transfer its headquarters to Bermuda. 113 Any suggestion of retaliation against an institution as vital to Hong Kong's stability as the Hongkong Bank would not have been in Beijing's own interests in the 1990s.
By the end of the twentieth century, the post-colonial rulers of Hong Kong no longer felt any dependency on the bank. In 1980, officials had rejected the suggestion that there should be open competition for the Government's banking business instead of automatically using the services of the Hongkong Bank. 114 In 2001, it was announced that henceforth, the Government's bankers would be chosen through open competition. 115 The Hongkong Bank would remain a formidable competitor for government business on its own merits. 116 But the new policy symbolised how changed was the bank's role in Hong Kong affairs.
Statistical Appendix
This appendix provides a variety of statistical information derived from the unpublished monthly returns that the former Banking Commission used to obtain from the banking industry. 117 with an acceptance of a responsibility to accommodate the economy's needs in times of crisis. Thus, it allowed its share of total loans and advances to expand during the 1965-67 crises, before shrinking back to the 1964 ratio in 1968.
The combined share of deposits captured by Mainland (i.e., "China state-owned") and local banks, as shown in Table 2 , was roughly equivalent to the Hongkong Bank group's share, a balance that was maintained over a long period. This table also shows how China's state-owned banks took market share primarily from the local banks after Deng Xiaoping's 1978 economic reforms allowed the Mainland banks to pursue commercial goals with diminishing political constraints. Both Mainland and local banks maintained more conservative ratios of loans and advances than the foreign sector overall. Table 3 shows how lending ballooned as share prices took off in the early 1970s. Table 4 casts additional light on this process with its examples of lending policies for selected banks. The Chartered and Hongkong
Banks were note-issuing banks and pursued conservative lending policies. Mainland and local banks were also cautious. Foreign banks were freer to respond when customer demand swelled during a period of intense market activity (as occurred in the 1972-73 stock market boom). They were able to expand lending in excess of their local deposit base because they could arrange support from their head offices and were thus less constrained by statutory liquidity requirements. 118 
